Arnezami, a hacker on the Doom9 forum, has published a crack for
extracting the “processing key” from a high-def DVD player. This key
can be used to gain access to every single Blu-Ray and HD-DVD disc.
Previously, another Doom9 user called Muslix64 had
broken both Blu-Ray and HD-DVD by extracting the “volume keys” for each
disc, a cumbersome process. This break builds on Muslix64's work but
extends it — now you can break all AACS-locked discs.
AACS took years to develop, and it has been broken in weeks. The developers spent billions, the hackers spent pennies.
For DRM to work, it has to be airtight. There can't be
a single mistake. It's like a balloon that pops with the first prick.
That means that every single product from every single vendor has to
perfectly hide their keys, perfectly implement their code. There can't
be a single way to get into the guts of the code to retrieve the
cleartext or the keys while it's playing back. All attackers need is a single mistake that they can use to compromise the system.
There is no future in which bits will get harder to
copy. Instead of spending billions on technologies that attack paying
customers, the studios should be confronting that reality and figuring
out how to make a living in a world where copying will get easier and
easier. They're like blacksmiths meeting to figure out how to protect
the horseshoe racket by sabotaging railroads.
The railroad is coming. The tracks have been laid
right through the studio gates. It's time to get out of the horseshoe
From Boing Boing. Or you can go read the article on Doom9.org.
This guide is part of the Machine
Identification Code Technology project. It explains how to read the date, time,
and printer serial number from forensic tracking codes in a Xerox DocuColor color laser
printout. This information is the result of research by
Robert Lee, Seth Schoen, Patrick Murphy, Joel Alwen, and Andrew “bunnie” Huang. We
acknowledge the assistance of EFF supporters who have contributed sample printouts to give us
material to study. We are still looking for help in this research; we are asking
the public to submit test
sheets or join
the printers mailing list to participate in our reverse engineering efforts.
The DocuColor series prints a rectangular grid of 15 by 8 miniscule yellow dots on
every color page. The same grid is printed repeatedly over the entire page, but the
repetitions of the grid are offset slightly from one another so that each grid is
separated from the others. The grid is printed parallel to the edges of the page,
and the offset of the grid from the edges of the page seems to vary.
These dots encode up to 14 7-bit bytes of tracking information, plus row and
column parity for error correction. Typically, about four of these bytes were unused
(depending on printer model), giving 10 bytes of useful data. Below, we explain how
to extract serial number, date, and time from these dots. Following the explanation,
we implement the decoding process in an interactive computer
Read the full article from EFF.